The Libertarian Bioethics Blog has recently transformed into an abstract review. Today's abstract concerns Sigrid Fry-Revere's 1992 paper in The Journal of Clinical Ethics titled "A Libertarian Critique of H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr.'s The Foundation of Bioethics." I have previously identified Fry-Revere as a libertarian bioethicist.
In the abstract Fry-Revere concludes that Engelhardt's The Foundation of Bioethics is unacceptable from a libertarian point of view because Engelhardt's "beliefs ... that fetuses, infants, and the mentally retarded are nonpersons ... are based on a misunderstanding of personhood and violate the principle of mutual respect." I look forward to a detailing reading of the article, for I have been seeking a belief system that can rationally explain why fetuses, infants, and the mentally retarded are persons/have rights while animals are not persons/do not have rights. Does Fry-Revere's theory meet this libertarian challenge?
Ayn Rand's objectivist theory of rights (the most lucid libertarian theory of rights I have encountered) asserts that rights can only be held by beings who are capable of reasoning and thinking; therefore, according to Rand, fetuses, infants, and the mentally retarded AND animals are not persons and do not have rights. How does Rand's theory solve the marginal-humans (fetuses, infants, the mentally retarded, and animals) dilemma? Fetuses, infants, and the mentally retarded have the potential to develop the capability of reasoning and thinking, whereas animals do not; thus fetuses, infants, and the mentally retarded have rights but animals do not.
Is Fry-Revere's libertarian theory of rights a strong competitor to Ayn Rand's objectivist theory of rights? Is Fry-Revere's theory a libertarian theory? Is Fry-Revere a libertarian?
Again I complete a post with more questions than answers.
In the abstract Fry-Revere concludes that Engelhardt's The Foundation of Bioethics is unacceptable from a libertarian point of view because Engelhardt's "beliefs ... that fetuses, infants, and the mentally retarded are nonpersons ... are based on a misunderstanding of personhood and violate the principle of mutual respect." I look forward to a detailing reading of the article, for I have been seeking a belief system that can rationally explain why fetuses, infants, and the mentally retarded are persons/have rights while animals are not persons/do not have rights. Does Fry-Revere's theory meet this libertarian challenge?
Ayn Rand's objectivist theory of rights (the most lucid libertarian theory of rights I have encountered) asserts that rights can only be held by beings who are capable of reasoning and thinking; therefore, according to Rand, fetuses, infants, and the mentally retarded AND animals are not persons and do not have rights. How does Rand's theory solve the marginal-humans (fetuses, infants, the mentally retarded, and animals) dilemma? Fetuses, infants, and the mentally retarded have the potential to develop the capability of reasoning and thinking, whereas animals do not; thus fetuses, infants, and the mentally retarded have rights but animals do not.
Is Fry-Revere's libertarian theory of rights a strong competitor to Ayn Rand's objectivist theory of rights? Is Fry-Revere's theory a libertarian theory? Is Fry-Revere a libertarian?
Again I complete a post with more questions than answers.
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