The fourth chapter of Peter Singer's The Expanding Circle is titled "Reason" and contains three interesting sections from the libertarian point of view.  

Singer attacks consequentialist and non-consequentialist varieties of ethical egoism.  He does not support consequentialist ethical egoism because he does not believe this ethical position "is valid as a means of satisfying the greatest total of preferences", which means Singer is ignorant about economics (he explicitly states that he doubts "that the facts are as ... defenders of the free market claim").  He opposes non-consequentialist ethical egoism because it "is potentially disastrous" and assumes "objective values".  

Singer asserts there is a rational but non-objective basis for ethics.  He claims that "the existence of ethics can be explained as the product of evolution among long-lived social animals with the capacity to reason" and, thus, "the need for belief in laws of ethics existing independently of us disappears."  The LIBERTARIAN BIOETHICS BLOGger agrees with these statements.

Singer does not limit the applicability of ethics to reasoning animals.  He expands the "circle of altruism" to include "all beings with the capacity to feel pleasure or pain".  Thus, he implicitly argues that, if one of the relevant variants of panpsychism is correct, ethical rules should be extended to include treatment of non-animals.  This is the portion of Singer's logic that fails miserably. Inexplicably he thinks reasoning organisms SHOULD apply rational ethics to non-reasoning organisms.  Why?  Libertarian bioethicists oppose the Singer principle.  Libertarian bioethicists believe that reasoning organisms SHOULD apply rational ethics only to reasoning organisms.  If a non-reasoning organism evolves to develop reason, then the libertarian bioethicist believes that rational ethics would then apply to that evolved reasoning organism.  By reason the libertarian bioethicist means an organism with the minimum biological tools needed to be able to engage in propositional logic (truth-value claims), whether or not the organism is currently actively engaging in propositional logic.

A commentary titled "Toward Improved Understanding of the Ethical and Clinical Issues Surrounding Mandatory Research Biopsies" published in the January 1, 2013 issue of the Journal of Clinical Oncology alerted me to a bioethics debate regarding "mandatory research biopsies versus the rights of prospective trial participants to freely consider consent to a research biopsy separately from consent to a clinical trial."  

Opponents of the practice of mandatory research biopsies cite the following issues: linking consent to a biopsy to participation in a clinical trial is coercive, mistaken assumption by patients that biopsy provides a clinical benefit, technical scientific problems limit the usefulness of the biopsies, and optional biopsies can achieve the same results as mandatory biopsies.

The optional biopsies option makes no damn sense to me.  After enrolling in a study a patient can always refuse to complete any portion of the trial he/she wishes, so "mandatory" research biopsies are in reality always "optional biopsies".  Problem solved.

The coercion complaint is the issue most interesting to a libertarian bioethicist.  What does coercion mean?  That is the crux of the matter.  The Dictionary.com app on my iPhone defines coercion as the "use of force or intimidation to obtain compliance."  A plumbline libertarian obviously opposes coercion if this is the definition.  This is not the definition of coercion, however, that the opponents of mandatory research biopsies are apparently utilizing.  The commentary author states the following: "It is clear that patients in some settings feel that they will be harmed, through loss of access to the experimental intervention, if they fail to pursue trial care.  This arguably creates a sense of coercion ... "  So another non-libertarian incorrectly defines coercion as harm.  Plumbline libertarians do not oppose harm, for one is harmed if someone steals your girlfriend, but stealing someone's girlfriend is not coercive and not unethical and not a libertarian crime.  Case closed.

In summary, the LIBERTARIAN BIOETHICS BLOGger supports mandatory research biopsies.

"Are Stem Cells Babies?: The Ethics of Making Perfect Transplants" is the title of the third chapter of Ronald Bailey's Liberation Biology.  This portion of the book addresses, not as comprehensively as the LIBERTARIAN BIOETHICS BLOGger desired, a question humans have been asking since the dawn of man: When does human life begin?  Bailey naturally opposes the typical conservative Christian doctrine of sperm/egg fertilization (an embryo) equaling a person.  Of interest, he notes that Jewish and Muslim doctrines are not consistent with this conservative Christian dogma either; apparently Jews believe embryos less than 40 days old are not persons and Muslims believe embryos less than 4 months old are not persons.  I admit the latter information was new to me.

Regardless of other traditions, the libertarian tradition provides no specific guidance on this fundamental bioethics issue.  I again propose, based on ideas from Sigrid Fry-Revere and Hans Hoppe, that embryos or fetuses or babies become persons when they have developed the minimum biologic structure capable of engaging in propositional logic regardless if this capability is currently expressed or not.  This means that an embryo or fetus or baby is a person when the embryo or fetus or baby has developed the appropriate neurologic structures needed for propositional logic (the basis of reason).  I write "embryo or fetus or baby" because it is unclear at this time when this event occurs.  This definition of personhood is certain to be controversial in libertarian circles, but any definition of personhood is controversial in libertarian circles.

Chapter 3 of Goodman, Musgrave, and Herrick's Lives at Risk: Single-Payer National Health Insurance Around the World attacks the myth that "single-payer systems make care available on the basis of need alone".  The primary evidence they cite against this claim are the growing private healthcare markets in many nation-states with single-payer national health insurance, particularly Britain and Canada.  More damning, however, is the information that many single-payer health care systems provide preferential treatment to private pay patients, mostly foreigners.  The Cuban state healthcare system, for example (not mentioned in the book), is well-known, primarily due to cinematic propaganda from filmmaker Michael Moore, for its medical tourism practices.  Ultimately, this book chapter demonstrates that the "need alone" assertion is rhetorical bullshit, even without utilizing basic economic theory, which proves the impossibility of providing any scarce good in a just manner via a "need alone" system.