One of the most controversial bioethics articles ever conceived was recently published in the Journal of Medical Ethics. The authors were Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva. The paper was entitled "After-birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live".
After article publication, apparently the authors and the journal editors received voluminous amounts of correspondence, many containing death threats.
In the article the authors argue that, "when the same conditions that would have justified abortion become known after birth", "after-birth abortion should be considered a permissible option for women". They distinguish after-birth abortion from infanticide "to emphasize that the moral status of the individual killed is comparable with that of a fetus (on which 'abortions' in the traditional sense are performed) rather than to that of a child." It is not hard to understand why this paper provoked vitriolic reactions.
The LIBERTARIAN BIOETHICS BLOGger experiences a mixed emotional reaction to this paper. Personally I find the concept of after-birth abortion/infanticide) morally repugnant. Philosophically, however, I find the concept of after-birth abortion/infanticide potentially viable. I shall (and should) explain. My current libertarian principle of personhood is the following: any organism with the minimum amount of mental equipment (biological or otherwise) necessary to engage in propositional logic (i.e. reason) is a person whether or not the equipment is ever employed. This principle may or may not conflict with the after-birth abortion/infanticide idea. If humans develop the minimum amount of mental equipment necessary to engage in propositional logic whether or not it is every employed prior to birth, then after-birth abortion/infanticide is a crime. If humans do not develop the minimum amount of mental equipment necessary to engage in propositional logic until at some point in time after birth, then after-birth abortion/infanticide is justifiable (at least until the newborn develops the minimum amount of mental equipment necessary to engage in propositional logic whether or not it is ever employed). The current state of science does not provide us this answer. My best guess, however, is that future scientific discoveries will demonstrate that a human fetus develops the minimum amount of mental equipment necessary to engage in propositional logic regardless of whether it is ever employed at some point in time during the 3rd trimester of pregnancy. But I could be wrong.
Good points of the article include the fact that it stimulated a large volume of philosophical discussion and skewered the potential person argument unfortunately utilized by Rothbard.
A bad point of the article was the authors's definition of personhood which was the following: "an individual who is capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that being deprived of this existence represents a loss to her."
After article publication, apparently the authors and the journal editors received voluminous amounts of correspondence, many containing death threats.
In the article the authors argue that, "when the same conditions that would have justified abortion become known after birth", "after-birth abortion should be considered a permissible option for women". They distinguish after-birth abortion from infanticide "to emphasize that the moral status of the individual killed is comparable with that of a fetus (on which 'abortions' in the traditional sense are performed) rather than to that of a child." It is not hard to understand why this paper provoked vitriolic reactions.
The LIBERTARIAN BIOETHICS BLOGger experiences a mixed emotional reaction to this paper. Personally I find the concept of after-birth abortion/infanticide) morally repugnant. Philosophically, however, I find the concept of after-birth abortion/infanticide potentially viable. I shall (and should) explain. My current libertarian principle of personhood is the following: any organism with the minimum amount of mental equipment (biological or otherwise) necessary to engage in propositional logic (i.e. reason) is a person whether or not the equipment is ever employed. This principle may or may not conflict with the after-birth abortion/infanticide idea. If humans develop the minimum amount of mental equipment necessary to engage in propositional logic whether or not it is every employed prior to birth, then after-birth abortion/infanticide is a crime. If humans do not develop the minimum amount of mental equipment necessary to engage in propositional logic until at some point in time after birth, then after-birth abortion/infanticide is justifiable (at least until the newborn develops the minimum amount of mental equipment necessary to engage in propositional logic whether or not it is ever employed). The current state of science does not provide us this answer. My best guess, however, is that future scientific discoveries will demonstrate that a human fetus develops the minimum amount of mental equipment necessary to engage in propositional logic regardless of whether it is ever employed at some point in time during the 3rd trimester of pregnancy. But I could be wrong.
Good points of the article include the fact that it stimulated a large volume of philosophical discussion and skewered the potential person argument unfortunately utilized by Rothbard.
A bad point of the article was the authors's definition of personhood which was the following: "an individual who is capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that being deprived of this existence represents a loss to her."
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